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 In recent years, the rather arcane subject of corporate governance, meaning the governance of 
the public companies that dominate the economy,2 has risen high on the political and legal agenda. 
Various reasons for this can be identified, prominent amongst them the debates, with which the 
governance issue has become entwined, about the virtues in relation to both social welfare and 
international competitiveness of different versions of capitalism and the corporation. As company lawyers 
are well aware, diverse opinions have emerged, with some advocating the adoption of a legal model of 
the company based around so-called stakeholding principles akin to those said to be found in Germany 
and Japan, while others seek to reinvigorate the traditional, shareholder-oriented, Anglo-American 
model.3 Despite these differences, however, there is widespread agreement that shareholders have an 
important role to play in ensuring good governance. For some, good governance requires a restoration of 
shareholder supervision and control.4 For others, including many supporters of `stakeholding', it should 
not be judged purely in terms of maximising `shareholder value' but still requires more `committed' 
ownership by shareholders, if only to eradicate the danger of `short-termism'.5 In keeping with this, the 
Labour government has recently asserted the need for more active and less fickle shareholding and has 
for some time been toying with the idea of making voting at company general meetings compulsory for 
institutional investors.6  
 Underlying this consensus is a shared assumption: that the shareholders of large corporations 
`own' the companies concerned;7 or in the `nexus of contracts' or `agency' theory of the company, in what 
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 This article uses the terms `corporation' and `corporate' to refer to large public companies, and 
`corporate governance' to refer to the general control and accountability of corporate executives rather 
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 Company lawyers, while generally skirting this issue, sometimes acknowledge that shareholders are 
not `owners' of the company in the usual sense of the word. They tend to assume, however, that they 
have a proprietorial interest in the company akin to ownership, hence, for example, the widespread 
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amounts to the same thing, that the shareholders own not `the company' but `the capital', the company 
itself having been spirited out of existence.8 It is natural corollary of this assumption that the interests of 
shareholders should take priority, if not complete precedence, over all others; and that shareholders 
should, as of right, have a substantial, if not an exclusive, say in the running of companies. As a result, 
stakeholders and others seeking significant governance reform are, in effect, placed in the position of 
asking shareholders to give up some of their ownership rights, or of trying to persuade them to exercise 
them in particular (`socially responsible') ways, either by arguing that it will be in their own best long-term 
interests to do so, or by appealing to their altruism.  
 However, despite the general acceptance of the `ownership' assumption, the legal nature of the 
share and shareholding are surrounded by uncertainty. As L.C.B. Gower says, the share does not readily 
fit into any `normal legal category'.9 Company lawyers are clear what a share is not - apart from when a 
company is wound up, a rare occurrence in the case of a public company, it is not an interest in the 
corporate assets.10 But they are much less clear what it actually is. The question `what ... is the exact 
juridical nature of the share', Gower observes, `is ... more easily asked than answered'. It is, perhaps, for 
this reason that `a definition of shares ... is something which text books have rarely attempted',11 though 
given the importance in the modern world of the share as a form of property and its position at the heart 
of company law, mediating the relationship between companies and their shareholders, this is rather 
curious. Moreover, as many have pointed out, it is in many ways equally difficult satisfactorily to 
distinguish shareholders from debenture holders. In `legal theory' they are `rigidly separated', but `in 
economic reality [they] merge into each other, ... [a] close examination of the rights conferred by [them] 
show[ing] the impossibility of preserving any hard and fast distinction between them which bears any 
relation to practical reality'.12 Rarely are these problems explored in any depth, however, one of the 
unfortunate effects of the relatively uncritical acceptance of the `ownership' assumption having been to 
foreshorten and substitute for analysis. This article seeks to lift the carpet of `ownership' under which they 
have been swept and, in so doing, hopes to shed light on some of the conceptual and theoretical 
conundrums that beset modern company law and to clarify some of the issues underlying the 
governance debate.  
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Usury and the concept of partnership  
 `Of all the branches of law', Gower writes, `[company law] is perhaps the one least readily 
understood except in relation to its historical development'.13 Nowhere is this truer than in relation to the 
sharp theoretical line drawn within company law between the investors who `in economic reality merge 
into each other' - the line between shareholders standing inside the company with rights in it and creditors 
standing outside the company with rights against it; between those who `own' and those who are merely 
`owed'. For this line can only properly be understood historically, by reference to the impact of the usury 
laws on the concept, and later the law, of partnership.  
 Although the term usury eventually came widely to be used to describe any extortionate bargain, 
in its original sense it involved loaning money for interest. The usurer was thus an antiquated version of 
what Marx later called the money capitalist, the only significant difference between usurer's capital and 
interest-bearing or money capital lying not in their form (both entail a movement from M - M'14) but in the 
social relations of production within which the money moves. Frowned upon in Greek and Roman times 
and completely prohibited in the Middle Ages, the taking of interest on loans was later permitted but rates 
of return regulated by statute, at which point usury came to be identified with the taking of excessive 
interest rather than with taking interest per se. To the modern mind, with its acceptance of the intrinsic 
productivity of money, this antipathy to `investment', to money as capital, seems a rather anachronistic 
theological prejudice, a quaint, pre-modern, superstition. In this context, the survival of the usury laws into 
the nineteenth century15 appears rather odd, an example of law lagging behind economy. However, while 
the hostility to usury can be traced back to biblical sources16 and came to constitute one of the principal 
elements of canon law, it had social and political, as well as religious, underpinnings. These were 
influentially outlined by Aristotle17 and remain relevant today.  
 For Aristotle, exchange was central to the social intercourse which made community, the pre-
requisite of human happiness, possible. By providing a standard of commensurability for unlike things, 
money facilitated exchange and thereby made an important contribution to social bonding. Usury, 
Aristotle argued, undermined money's ability to perform these functions and subverted the fairness in 
exchange which was `the salvation of states'. It was, he claimed, `unnatural', for money was inherently 
unproductive. Lacking genitals - `organs for generating any other such piece', as Bentham put it18 - 
money was sterile and barren; of all the ways of getting wealth, `money produced out of money ... was 
the most contrary to nature'. The usurer made money without working for it, taking, in the form of interest, 
part of the product of the labour of others. Moreover, Aristotle argued, usury was also unnatural in the 
sense that the acquisition of money tended towards infinity and endless multiplication, encouraging greed 
for its own sake. One could, like Midas, have an abundance of money and yet still perish from hunger. 
For Aristotle, therefore, usury undermined justice in exchange, corrupted market relations and subverted 
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the ethical roots of social, political and economic order.19 There were many later expressions of this view, 
among the most vivid that found in The Divine Comedy, in which Dante located usurers, their faces 
charred beyond recognition by fiery rain, in the seventh circle of the Inferno at the very edge of the 
second division of hell to reflect `the degree to which [their] particular offense destroy[ed] communal life 
and the possibility of spiritual happiness...'.20 In marked contrast to modern legal systems, Dante treated 
fraud more harshly than violence precisely because it eroded the trust and confidence without which 
community would disintegrate. The theory of usury which emerged in the Middle Ages was `not, then, an 
isolated freak of casuistical ingenuity, but [a] subordinate element in a comprehensive system of social 
philosophy'.21   
 The legal antipathy to usury can be traced back at least as far as Roman law. However, not only 
did Roman law permit usury as long as the interest charged was not excessive, it distinguished potentially 
usurious contracts of loan (mutuum) from other transactions in which payment for the use of money was 
considered legitimate, prominent amongst them the contract of partnership (societas).22 Over time, as 
trade expanded and money came increasingly to be borrowed as well as lent as capital (rather than to 
meet an immediate material need), the legitimacy of many forms of `investment' was established through 
an expansion of the scope of concepts such as partnership and a corresponding narrowing of the 
concept of the (potentially usurious) loan. The result was the legal constitution of many inactive providers 
of money as `partners' rather than `lenders', essentially on the grounds that they put their capital at risk. 
The concept of partnership that emerged - the `one great and universal form of licit investment in 
commerce throughout medieval Europe' - entered scholastic thought `largely in the form given it by 
Roman law'.23 Despite their desire to prohibit usury, therefore, for most canonists and jurists `there was a 
world of difference between usury, [profit obtained from] a contract of loan .., and justifiable returns 
derived from partnerships, where there was a sharing of risk and venture of the capital'.24 Nevertheless, 
there was much disagreement (and confusion) among them as to the status of some contractual 
arrangements in which money was provided in return for a reward, particularly those in which the liability 
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of investors to third parties was restricted.25 In `analysing and systematising the law of usury for the first 
time', however, the canonists not only `provided a rational foundation for the dramatic growth of 
commercial and financial life during the Middle Ages',26 they developed a very spacious theory of 
`partnership' based around ideas of risk and ownership. It was encapsulated by Aquinas:  
He who commits his money to a merchant or craftsman by means of some kind of 
partnership does not transfer the ownership of his money to him but it 
remains his; so that at his risk the merchant trades, or the craftsman 
works with it; and therefore he can licitly seek part of the profit thence 
coming as from his own property.27   
 
According to this theory, if an investor of money shared the risk of a venture, the arrangement ceased to 
be a loan and became a partnership. As Patrick Atiyah points out, the concept of risk employed was 
rather odd for nobody who lends money is ever guaranteed to get it back.28 Under the theory, however, if, 
this inherent risk apart, the investor was promised his money back with an additional sum above that 
legally permitted, the transaction was a loan and potentially usurious. If, on the other hand, the return was 
neither guaranteed nor fixed in advance but depended on the success, or otherwise, of the venture, the 
investor was deemed a risk-taking partner. Usury thus entailed the idea of certain gain. As Aquinas 
emphasised, the issue of risk was itself bound up with the issue of ownership. In a loan arrangement, it 
was argued, the money lender transferred ownership of his money to the borrower, took a fixed and 
guaranteed return, and dispensed with the risk to his property; whereas in a partnership the provider of 
money retained ownership of his property and thus put it at risk. This not only justified his return, it made 
it possible to attribute it to the goods which the money had been used to buy, rather than to the sterile and 
barren money itself.29 In this way, over time, the usury laws contributed to the radical differentiation of two 
sorts of money investor: `lenders' outside associations receiving interest; and `partners' inside 
associations sharing profits.  
 The teaching of the canonists on usury was received in significant part into civil law, and in 
England, where `any transaction which involved usury was clearly illegal in medieval common law', as 
late as the seventeenth century English law's conception of usury remained derivative of canon law.30  As 
the economic foundations of society changed, however, there gradually emerged more and more ways in 
which the usury laws could be circumvented and more and more methods of investment recognised as 
legitimate by both the religious and secular authorities, either by official declaration or by acquiescence. 
With this, the morality and legality of taking a return on money lent was increasingly accepted as long as 
only a moderate amount of interest and not turpes usurae had been charged. In a series of statutes 
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passed in the sixteenth century, English law came effectively to permit the charging of interest of up to 
10% per annum;31 by 1713, however, this had fallen to 5 per cent, the level at which it remained for the 
rest of the century.32  
 The result was that during the eighteenth century, the formative period of the modern English law 
of partnership,33 the usury laws, still `feared and ... far from obsolete',34 continued to influence the 
characterisation of different forms of `investment' in English law. Thus, although the law of partnership 
`presumed that each partner was an active trader in a joint concern [with] full power to act as agent of his 
fellow partners'35, in accordance with the `risk' theory of partnership the legal status of inactive providers 
of money vis-a-vis third parties was determined by reference to the content of their financial return rather 
than by reference to their involvement (or otherwise) in the running of the concern. As Blackstone J 
explained in Grace v Smith: 
the true criterion (when money is advanced to a trader) is to consider whether the profit 
or premium is certain and defined, or casual, indefinite, and depending 
on the accidents of the trade. In the former case it is a loan (whether 
usurious or not, is not material to the present question), in the latter a 
partnership.36  
 
Thus `lenders' who received interest (a return `certain and defined') were distingushed from `partners' 
who received a share in profits (a return `casual, indefinite and depending on the accidents of trade'), 
although both received the return on their capital in the same form - as a reward for the mere ownership 
of money. It followed that any investor whose return, even if described as `interest', varied with the profits 
of a business was liable to be deemed a partner and fully liable for partnership debts,37 as were clerks or 
managers who received a share of profits in return for their his services.38 Partners were also deemed to 
have an interest in the partnership assets. At common law, they were treated as joint tenants or tenants 
in common of personal property belonging to the partnership, and as tenants in common of partnership 
land; in equity, partnership property was treated as though held by all the partners on trust to be used for 
the proper business purposes of the partnership.39 The law of partnership thus came to embody a 
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distinction similar to that elaborated by Marx between money capitalists, those who contribute funds, and 
industrial capitalists, those who utilise those funds in the production process.40 Lenders were, in effect, 
deemed money capitalists (and, therefore, potential usurers) because they transferred ownership of their 
property and it did not, therefore, change in form before returning to them: the movement of their capital 
was M - M'. The capital of partners, on the other hand, even those uninvolved in management, was 
conceptualised as having moved through a productive circuit, M - C - P - C' - M'.41 Indeed, even in 
relation to inactive rentier partners, there was some justification for this characterisation. Most early 
partnerships had been transient affairs, created for a specific trading venture after which assets were 
sold and proceeds distributed, enabling partners periodically to liquidate their investment and gain access 
to their capital. By the later eighteenth century, however, as industrial enterprises grew in number, many 
partnerships were becoming more permanent affairs, with the result that the money of rentier investors 
was often tied up in productive assets for a prolonged period, giving those investors the character of 
industrial rather than money capitalists, despite the passive nature of their investment and lack of 
managerial involvement. Nevertheless, while the usury laws were in force, there was a `tendency ... to 
treat what was in truth a loan at usurious interest, and therefore illegal, as a contract of partnership and 
therefore legal'.42 Indeed, to some partnership lawyers writing later in the nineteenth century, some of 
these arrangements involved not true partnerships but loans, suggesting to them that the canonical 
justification of them and the theory of partnership upon which it was based was deeply hyprocritical.43  
 
The personified company and shareholder ownership  
 In order fully to grasp the significance of these developments for company law, it is important to 
remember that what we now call `company law' began life in the early nineteenth century as `joint stock 
company law', meaning the body of law applicable to joint stock companies, and that until the latter half of 
the century, it was considered and treated as an adjunct of the law of partnership. Although founded upon 
the partnership principle of trading on a joint account, the joint stock company was distinguished from the 
`ordinary' partnership on the basis of its economic, rather than its legal, characteristics. Crucially, the 
rentier investor, who could be accomodated within the ordinary partnership but who was largely 
peripheral to it, lay at the heart of the joint stock company. Characterised by large numbers of inactive 
shareholders, by increasingly specialist managers and by freely transferable shares44 - the essential 
features of the modern `public company' - joint stock companies could in law be incorporated or 
unincorporated. A joint stock company was a joint stock company irrespective of its legal status.45 
                                                                
partner's lien. The modern view is that partners are beneficially entitled to the totality of the partnership 
assets. 
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 `The employer of capital - even when working with his own capital splits into two personalities - the 
owner of capital and the employer of capital; with reference to the categories of profit which it yields, his 
capital also splits into capital property, capital outside the production process, and yielding interest of 
itself, and capital in the production process which yields a profit of enterprise through its function'. Marx, 
Capital Vol III (1894; London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1978) 375. 
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Companies (London: Maxwell, 4th ed 1878) 22-23. 
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Correspondingly, early `joint stock company law' texts examined the law relating to both incorporated and 
unincorporated concerns.46  
 Equally importantly, for many years all joint stock companies, incorporated as well as 
unincorporated, were considered to be types of partnership. In the parlance of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, they were `public' partnerships, distinguishable from `ordinary' or `private' 
partnerships on quantitative rather than qualitative grounds.47 Like ordinary partnerships, all joint stock 
companies tended, therefore, to be conceptualised as aggregates of individuals. Incorporation was seen 
as creating a separate legal entity, but the resulting `body corporate' was thought to consist of `several 
individuals, united in such a manner that they and their successors constitute but one person in law, a 
person distinct from that of any of the members, though made up of them all...'.48 There was, as yet, no 
conception of `the company', even if incorporated, as something with an existence entirely of its own, as 
an object completely separate from its shareholders. On the contrary, the shareholders were the 
company, hence the persistence for much of the nineteenth century of the view that directors were simply 
agents of `the company' and subject to the control of the shareholders (`the company') in general 
meeting. Hence also the regular description of incorporated and unincorporated companies as `theys', 
and the notion, exemplified by the 1856 Joint Stock Companies Act, that people `formed themselves' into 
companies, with its implication that companies were made of, rather than by, them.49 
 Crucially, while they were conceptualised in this way, the principles of the law of partnership, 
slightly modified, were thought to be applicable to companies, and as the early texts make clear this was 
considered true of incorporated, as well as of unincorporated, firms.50 Incorporation was seen as offering 
joint stocks certain important legal privileges which took them to some extent outside the principles of the 
law of partnership, but it was not thought to provide a fully fledged alternative legal form.51 Nowhere was 
the perception of `joint stock company law' as a branch of the law of partnership52 made clearer than in 
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 Thus, the first `company law' text, Charles Wordsworth's The Law Relating to Railway, Bank, 
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 See, for example, William Watson, A Treatise of the Law of Partnership (London: Butterworth, 2nd 
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opposed to the conception of corporations in general]', wrote Samuel Williston, `the law has been formed 
very largely since 1800', `History of the law of Business Corporations before 1800' (1888) 2 Harvard Law 
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chapters on the companies occupying different fields of activity, see Wordsworth, n 46 above, (2nd ed 
1837). Thus, Sealy's suggestion that partnership principles were invoked to fill the `gaps' in company law 
is rather misleading. There were, in fact, more gaps than law, with the principles of the law of partnership 
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the title of Nathaniel Lindley's A Treatise on the Law of Partnership, including its application to Joint Stock 
Companies, first published in 1860. Indeed, Lindley continued for many years to describe company law 
as a `mere statutory development' of the law of partnership53 and not until the final decades of the century 
did it finally crystallise into a legal category in its own right. In the meantime, judges regularly turned to the 
rules of partnership when there was no case on companies to guide them, ceasing `only when the idea of 
the legal personality of the company had permeated all the courts'.54  
 In accordance with partnership principles, ownership of a joint stock company share was 
considered in law to bestow on the holder an interest in the assets of the company, with the shareholders 
of both incorporated and unincorporated companies conceptualised as the equitable owners of the 
company's assets, whatever they might be, realty or personalty. Shareholders were, then, not only `the 
company', they were, quite literally, legally constituted as the `owners' of its assets. In certain respects, 
this characterisation of shareholders as `owners' was always rather strained, for as Adam Smith 
observed, `the greater part of these proprietors seldom pretend[ed] to understand any thing of the 
business of the company; ... giv[ing] themselves no trouble about it, ... receiv[ing] contentedly such half 
yearly or yearly dividend, as the directors think proper to make to them'.55 Indeed, there remained some 
ambiguity as to the precise nature and status of joint stock company shareholding, for some companies 
treated shareholders rather like lenders, paying interest on all paid-up capital from the outset, even in the 
period before the company had become productive and profitable.56 However, in other respects there 
was a material basis for the assertion of a property nexus between shareholders and the company's 
assets, for although joint stock company shares were formally freely transferable, in theory enabling 
shareholders to liquidate their capital at will, throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the 
market for shares was primitive.57 In the absence of a developed share market, the money of 
shareholders, transformed into assets under the control of the company, was tied up, potentially for an 
extended period of time,58 in the same way, though not to the same degree, as the capital of the rentier 
investor in a partnership.59 Moreover, notwithstanding Smith's disparaging comments, compared to their 
latter-day counterparts eighteenth and early nineteenth joint stock company shareholders took a much 
greater supervisory interest in their investments.60 Some companies even financially penalised 
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proprietors who neglected to attend general meetings in person or by proxy.61 
 
The depersonification of the joint stock company and the emergence of autonomous company 
law  
 The early-to-mid nineteenth century, however, saw major changes in the economic nature of the 
joint stock company. The catalyst was a rapid growth in both the number and size of joint stock 
companies, particularly following the dramatic development of the railway system. Investment in railway 
companies was not only on a much larger scale than anything previously seen, it embraced groups 
hitherto uninvolved in investment and took a radically depersonalised rentier form.62 As a result, in the 
period after 1830 there emerged for the first time a developed market in joint stock company shares 
which transformed them into money capital - readily marketable commodities, liquid assets easily 
converted into money.63 This transformation in the economic nature of the share was reflected in, and 
reinforced by, its legal reconceptualisation. Following the seminal 1837 case of Bligh v Brent,64 it came to 
be held that shareholders had no direct interest, legal or equitable, in the property owned by the 
company, only a right to dividends and a right to assign their shares for value. By 1860, the shares of 
both incorporated and unincorporated joint stock companies had been established as legal objects in 
their own right, as forms of property independent of the assets of the company.65 In constituting the share 
as a form of property in its own right, in stressing its monied character and in relieving it of any direct 
connection to the assets of the company, the Courts, in effect, reconstituted the circuit of the 
shareholders capital as M - M'. Moreover, with this, the capital of joint stock companies seemingly 
doubled. The assets were now owned by the company and by the company alone, either through a 
corporation or, in the case of unincorporated companies, through trustees. The intangible share capital of 
the company, on the other hand, was the sole property of the shareholder. A vital legal space thus 
emerged between companies - owners of assets - and shareholders - owners of shares.  
 The separation of shareholder from company inherent in the development of the share market66 
and the establishment of the share as an autonomous, liquid form of property was reinforced by other 
related changes. For example, Sealy suggests that as long as the liability of shareholders remained 
                                                                
means guaranteed, shares tended to be seen more as speculations than investments. 
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unlimited `general meetings were diligently attended and matters of policy were actively debated', and 
that even after the introduction of general limited liability in 1855 `shareholders continued to take their role 
seriously'.67 This exaggerates shareholder assiduity - the great majority of joint stock company 
shareholders had never in any meaningful sense acted like participating industrial capitalists inside the 
association. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that there was for many years some degree of supervision of 
company management by shareholders and that this steadily declined as the century progressed. 
Increasingly, investors moved from holding shares in one or a small number of companies in whose 
affairs they took an active interest to holding a diversified basket of securities, a development marked 
from the 1870's by the rise of financial intermediaries and of modern financial reporting.68 Shareholders 
sought security not from an active monitoring of management but from the de facto limited liability 
provided by the rise of the fully paid-up share69 and from risk-spreading. As they thereby became part of 
what J.H. Clapham called `blind capital seeking its 5 per cent',70 any significant involvement in 
management or managerial supervision more or less ceased. Professional managers were paid to run 
enterprises, and the great majority of shareholders were reduced to the status of functionless rentiers, 
receiving their income in the form (if not at the level) of interest - that is, as a return on their capital 
accruing with the mere passage of time. As the transformation of shareholders `from active participant[s] 
to passive investor[s]' was completed, shareholders were not only clearly established (both in law and in 
economic reality) as money capitalists standing outside the company and the production process, the 
company, the sole legal and equitable owner of the firm's industrial capital, was itself `depersonified ... 
ceasing to be an association and ... becoming an institution'.71 Following the 1862 Companies Act, 
people no longer `formed themselves' into incorporated companies, they `formed' incorporated 
companies, objects external to them, made by them but not of them. In short, `the company' was 
reified.72  
 These changes in the economic (and legal) nature of the company and shareholding had 
profound effects on the developing law relating to joint stock companies. As the economic and 
conceptual expulsion of the shareholder was increasingly recognised, so too was the depersonified 
nature of `the company' itself. This was reflected both in the Companies Acts 1844-62, which made 
corporate status with limited liability available on mere registration, and in the common law. The doctrine 
of ultra vires, for example, which developed principally to protect the integrity of the share as a form of 
property,73 placed the newly reified `company' in certain respects beyond even the unanimous collective 
will of shareholders.74 More generally, there was a move from seeing directors as subject to the direction 
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and control of the company, meaning the shareholders in general meeting, to seeing them as a self-
standing organ of the company as a separate, depersonified entity. This conceptual change was 
accompanied by a decline in the right of shareholders to intervene in the day-to-day running of 
companies and by a steady shift of power from general meeting to board.75 As their `ownership' rights 
were steadily eroded, shareholders `surrendered a set of definite rights for a set of indefinite 
expectations'.76 
 In underlining the externality of the shareholder, these economic and legal changes laid the 
foundations for the emergence of the modern doctrine of separate corporate personality. The `complete 
separation'77 of company and members that this entailed was not, as company lawyers tend to assume, 
inherent in the legal act of incorporation.78 Rather, the legal meaning of incorporation in a business 
context was, rather, reinterpreted in the latter half of the nineteenth century to accommodate the radical 
economic separation of joint stock companies from their shareholders.79 In heightening the qualitative 
differences between joint stock companies and `ordinary' partnerships,80 these changes also laid the 
foundations for the emergence of joint stock company law as a body of law in its own right, autonomous 
from the law of partnership. As Michael Lobban observes, from around mid-century, as `the company 
came to be seen as more of an abstract entity and less a collection of equally liable partners', the 
unsuitability when applied to joint stock companies of partnership principles, with their presumption of 
active participation and agency,81 became ever clearer and a `new company law regime' began to 
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emerge.82 However, with `hoary old ideas of partnership continu[ing] to confuse thinking with regard to 
corporate enterprise', this took time.83 It was not until the late 1880's, for example, that Lindley finally 
ceased subsuming his coverage of company law within his treatise on partnership and accorded it a 
volume of its own.84  
 
Company law and the problem of the share  
Consideration of the historical circumstances of company law's emergence as an autonomous legal 
category establishes the close link between the conceptual structure of modern company law and the 
nineteenth century joint stock company. In the period after 1870, with the rise of the private company, 
`company law' came to be applied not only to joint stock companies but to all forms of business 
organisation, sole traders and small partnerships included, a process legitimated by the famous decision 
in Salomon.85 As, slowly but surely, it was detached from the joint stock company as an economic form of 
organisation, `joint stock company law' became simply `company law'. However, by this time its basic 
conceptual structure was already in place, and it was, of course, a conceptual structure designed and 
developed by legislature and courts with the joint stock company in mind.86 Despite much subsequent 
company law reform, this structure has changed remarkably little, generating many conceptual problems. 
In short, a body of law designed for application to nineteenth century joint stock companies - single entity, 
national companies whose shareholders had been relieved of any meaningful ownership function - has 
come to be applied to both small private concerns, in which shareholders and company are often to all 
intents and purposes one, and to multi-unit, multi-divisional, multi-national corporations. As a result, the 
conceptual structure of company law has become ever more divorced from the economic realities to 
which it applies87 and taken on a life of its own. Detached from its own history and material origins, it 
tends to be seen as flowing naturally and inevitably from the legal act of incorporation; as existing apart 
from any economic reality. This has not only facilitated its manipulation by capital, it has contributed to 
absurdities - most notably concerning the treatment of parent companies and their subsidiaries88 - and to 
conceptual ossification.  
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 Consideration of the historical circumstances of its emergence also reveals company law's 
continuing failure to come to terms with the material conditions of its own creation. By the end of the 19th 
century, not only did shareholding no longer entail ownership of the corporate assets, in an era of general 
limited liability, fully paid-up shares and diversified holdings, it had ceased to be especially risky. 
Increasingly, shareholders wanted - and corporate managers provided - regular dividends from shares, 
with the result that shares (and diversified share portfolios) came widely to be seen as sources of steady 
income streams rather than as speculative financial instruments whose returns varied dramatically with 
the ups and downs of a business. In short, shares came to exhibit `debt-like features'.89 With corporate 
shareholders ever more `passive and functionless, remarkable only in [their] capacity to share, without 
effort or even without appreciable risk, the gains of .. growth..',90 the justifications for their residual 
`ownership' rights became ever harder to discern. And yet, although its emergence as an autonomous 
legal category was premised precisely on a recognition of the `complete separation' of shareholder from 
the joint stock company, company law, `while stopping short of according shareholders ownership rights 
over corporations, nevertheless [continued to] vest significant property rights in the shareholders as 
residual claimants'.91 It still does, clinging on to the vestiges of shareholder `ownership' and retaining for 
them their place at the centre of the governance stage. In this context, one does not have to look far for 
the sources of the conceptual difficulties that company lawyers have encountered in trying accurately to 
characterise and define the nature of the share and shareholding.  
 As Robert Pennington says, `despite [their] familiarity with them ... [the courts] have found it 
extraordinarily difficult to define the legal nature of shares'.92 Indeed, there are marked differences of 
emphasis even among the minority of company lawyers who bother to attempt to do so. Because of the 
lack of any direct link between the share and the assets of the company - the term `share' is `something 
of a misnomer, for shareholders no longer share any property in common'93 - some stress its contractual 
qualities. Pennington himself, for example, asserts that shares `are simply bundles of contractual and 
statutory rights which the shareholder has against the company',94 approvingly quoting in support the oft-
cited definition offered by Farwell J in Borland's Trustee v Steel Bros & Co Ltd: 
`A share is the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of money, 
for the purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest in the second, 
but also consisting of a series of mutual covenants entered into by all 
the shareholders inter se in accordance with [s 14 of the Companies 
Act 1985]. The contract contained in the articles of association is one of 
the original incidents of the share. A share is .... an interest measured 
by a sum of money and made up of various rights contained in the 
contract, including the right to a sum of money of a more or less 
amount.95  
 
The concept of the share in this decision, Pennington tells us, is clear. The contract contained in the 
company's memorandum and articles, and in the Companies Act 1985 `gives rise to contractual 
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obligations of each member as regards the company and every other member. The aggregate of these 
rights and obligations of a member is his shareholding, and when divided between the shares he holds, 
they constitute his shares'.96 But Pennington is aware that there are problems with this view, not least 
because to assert, as he repeatedly does, that shares are simply bundles of contractual and statutory 
rights held by shareholders `against the company' underlines the shareholder's externality to the 
company and blurs the distinction between them and debenture holders. Thus, he concedes that `it is 
tempting to deduce from [the contractual nature of the share] that the relationship between [shareholder] 
and ... company is that of creditor and debtor'. While, he assures us, this is `quite wrong',97 he shows a 
marked reluctance either to describe the share as `property' or the shareholder as an `owner' of the 
company. The contractual rights which make up the share are of `a peculiar nature' in that they are 
transferable and for that reason, he tells us, shares `have been called "property"'. But he feels unable to 
endorse this view, merely commenting that it is `innocuous enough, provided that it is remembered that 
they do not comprise any proprietary interest in the company's assets'.98 He describes the conclusion to 
which he is drawn as `disappointing', though `confusing' might be more apt. `The most that may be said', 
he says, is that `shares in a registered company ... are a species of intangible movable property which 
comprise a collection of rights and obligations relating to an interest in a company of an economic and 
proprietary character, but not constituting a debt'.99 
 More widespread is the view that shares constitute both property and a proprietorial interest in 
the company. `It is tempting to equate shares with rights under a contract', writes Gower, `[but] a share is 
something far more than a mere contractual right in personam'.100 While it is doubtful `whether the rights 
which a share confers on its holder can be classified as "proprietary" in the usual sense', it is clear that 
`the share itself is an object of dominion, i.e. of rights in rem and not so to regard it would be barren and 
academic in the extreme'. As he says, for all practical purposes shares are recognised in law, as well as 
in fact, `as objects of property which are bought, sold, mortgaged and bequeathed.'101 More problematic 
is giving legal substance to the view that the shareholder has a proprietary interest in the company. 
Although, like Pennington, Gower cites Farwell J's definition of the share, he stresses that while `it lays 
considerable and perhaps disproportionate stress on the contractual nature of the shareholder's rights, [it] 
also emphasises the fact that [the shareholder] has an interest in the company'; that `a share constitutes 
the holder a member of the company'.102 He does not, however, find it easy to specify the precise nature 
and basis of this proprietary interest:  
The theory seems to be that the contract constituted by the articles of association 
defines the nature of the rights, which, however, are not purely personal 
rights but instead confer some sort of proprietary interest in the 
company though not in its property (emphasis added).103  
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 Indeed, Gower expresses concern that an analysis of the `proprietary and financial aspects of a 
shareholder's rights' might `obscure the important fact that his shareholding causes him to become a 
member of an association'.104 The problem, as this implicitly suggests, is that the basis for the privileged 
status of the shareholder as a `member' is, indeed, `obscure', hence Deakin and Slinger's observation 
that `it is difficult to find support within company law for the widespread assumption ... that shareholders 
"own" the business...'.105 Such difficulties multiply when one tries clearly to distinguish shareholders from 
debenture holders. As Gower acknowledges, the rigid theoretical separation between shareholders, with 
rights in the company as well as against it, and debenture-holders, with rights against the company but 
never in the company itself, collapses in contemporary `economic reality'.106 Sealy concurs:  
The theoretical differences between being a creditor of the company and being a 
member are considerable from a legal point of view, but (at least in the 
case of a solvent and prosperous company) the practical 
consequences for investors, apart sometimes from tax considerations, 
are very similar ....  an investment in debentures or debenture stock is 
very similar to an investment in shares: both are securities in the 
corporate sector of the economy offering different kinds of risk and 
different kinds of return.107   
 
The reality is, of course, that both debenture holders and shareholders are money capitalists, external to 
companies and to the production process itself. Disinterested and uninvolved in management, and, in 
any case, largely stripped (in law as well as in economic reality) of genuine corporate ownership rights, 
the shareholder is, as Berle and Means pointed out, `not dissimilar in kind from the bondholder or lender 
of money'.108 While, therefore, the relationship between shareholder and company is not exactly one of 
lender to borrower - the share is not, as some have suggested, a kind of loan - neither is it in any 
meaningful sense one of owner to owned. The share is a particular and distinctive form of money capital; 
property in the form of a claim on the company's profits.109  
 
Corporate governance and the myth of ownership  
Ultimately, the conceptual pea-souper enveloping the share and shareholding arises from modern 
company law's failure to take separate corporate personality seriously enough, and its consequent 
attempt to straddle two essentially irreconcilable positions. On the one hand, through the doctrine of 
separate corporate personality in its modern form, company law expresses and reinforces not only the 
separate existence of `the company' but the erosion, de jure and de facto, of the shareholder's ownership 
rights. As we have seen, historically these developments provided the basis for company law's 
crystallisation out from the law of partnership and its emergence as a separate legal category in its own 
right. It has also resulted in company law taking separate corporate personality very seriously in certain 
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contexts where it is hard to justify, for example in relation to the treatment of private companies and, 
more importantly, the subsidiaries of large corporations.  
 On the other hand, in other ways company law has failed fully to recognise the implications of the 
depersonification of the company and the reduction of the corporate shareholder to the status of a rentier 
investor with an interest very similar to that of a debenture holder. It has tried instead to hang on to the 
(always rather artificial) characterisation of corporate shareholders as `insiders', `members' and `owners', 
continuing to grant to them exclusive residual `ownership' rights - most crucially, of course, the right to 
vote in general meetings. It has done this notwithstanding the true economic nature of the share; 
notwithstanding the absence of any property nexus between shareholders and the company's assets; 
notwithstanding the radical externality of shareholders to `the company' and their superfluousness to and 
disinterest in the process of production; notwithstanding the fact that there are serious question marks 
over the legitimacy of their residual control rights, as was well as over their desire, competence, and 
practical ability to exercise them; and notwithstanding the fact that company law itself has done so much 
to demote them from the status of owners. In short, company law has not taken separate corporate 
personality really seriously in contexts where it would be entirely justified so to do. Fuelled by the 
ownership myth and the legal remnants which sustain it, it continues rather to treat company and 
shareholders as in crucial respects synonymous. As a result of this `anomalous hangover from earlier 
times', and despite the fact that `the ... company has ceased to be a "they" and has come to be seen as 
an "it"', the law insists on treating `shareholders, collectively, as [its] only legitimate constituency'.110 
Fiduciary duties, in particular, still rest on this `out-of-date assumption', with English law holding that the 
duty of directors is to act `in the best interests of the company', interpreted to mean in the best interests 
of the shareholders.111 It is not surprising, then, that when Sealy asks `how have we lawyers handled th[e] 
notion that a company is a separate "person"?', his answer is `very confusingly'.112 The uncertainty 
surrounding the nature of the share and shareholding is just one of the many conundrums that have 
accompanied the incomplete depersonification of the company.  
 At present, the tendency among company lawyers is to deal with these problems by discrete 
omission. The legal nature of the share, if it is addressed at all, is usually afforded cursory treatment, with 
shareholders simply assumed, in some rather unspecific `common sense' way, to be the `owners' of the 
company.113 John Parkinson, for example, recognises that `shareholders are not the owners of the 
company's assets as a matter of strict law', but quickly adds that `they are in substance the owners by 
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virtue of being the contributors of the company's capital'.114 In this context, his argument, although not 
denying the existence of `the company', resembles that of `nexus of contracts' theorists115 who seek to 
dispose of the problem of corporate ownership by reducing the company to a series of contractual 
relations so that it disappears as an entity capable of being `owned'. The `ownership of capital', these 
theorists quite rightly argue, `should not be confused with ownership of the firm'.116 However, in disposing 
of one confusion - that shareholders `own' the corporation - they substitute another, conflating, under the 
rubric `capital', the assets owned by the company and the shares (rights to part of the corporate product, 
but not to the assets themselves) owned by the shareholders. In dissolving `the company' and declaring 
shareholders the owners or `contributors' or `providers' of `the capital', nexus of contracts theorists, in 
effect, appropriate for shareholders the corporate assets.117  
 Crucially, of course, the `mistaken analogy'118 of shareholder ownership, whether of the company 
itself or of `the capital', continues to cast a long shadow over the governance debate, serving as the main 
justification for the anachronistic retention by shareholders of exclusive governance rights and for the 
claim that public companies should be run predominantly, if not exclusively, in their interests.119 It has 
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also done much to shape the debates about corporate governance, most importantly, perhaps, in 
causing the issue generally to be cast, following Berle and Means, in terms of a `separation of ownership 
and control', with the result that the problem is characterised by many as little more than an 
administrative dilemma, an agency problem, potentially resolvable by a restoration of shareholder 
monitoring and supervision. Given the economic nature of corporate shareholding, this solution is not 
only of questionable legitimacy, it is, as many argue, unlikely to work. Thus, Easterbrook and Fischel 
deride proposals to enhance shareholder participation120 and John Kay remarks that `all experience 
suggests' that renewed shareholder involvement and supervision is `not very likely to happen, and would 
not improve the functioning of corporations if it did'.121  
 As company lawyers are well aware, however, it has forcefully been argued in recent years that 
the growth in institutional investment and the related rise of the so-called market for corporate control has 
restored the old model, enabling shareholders effectively to re-assert their rights and, through that, to 
monitor management and ensure good governance. Despite the divisions of opinion on this matter,122 it 
is clear that in the U.S. the evidence of the growing influence of institutional investors is strong,123 though 
its forms have changed somewhat in recent years. In the eighties, the emphasis was on take-overs and 
leveraged buy outs; more recently it has been on what some have called a `political model of 
governance'124 based on the development of longer term investor-corporation relations and generating 
the rise of what has variously been called a `fiduciary' or `investor' capitalism.125 Although direct and 
public institutional investor involvement has thus far been less marked in Britain,126 it is clear that there 
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has long been `behind the scenes corporate governance' by financial institutions127 and evidence is now 
emerging that U.K. fund management is becoming more Americanized.128 Overall, it seems indisputable 
that the Anglo-American corporate world has changed considerably in the last couple of decades, with 
corporate conduct becoming `more focused on rising share prices, and [on making] corporate 
performance more profitable'.129 Even, therefore, if attempts by institutional investors directly and in detail 
to police business policy are the exception and likely to remain so, there can be little doubt that corporate 
managers are increasingly subject to institutional investor scrutiny and increasingly aware of the 
importance, not least in terms of their own survival, of maintaining share price and enhancing 
`shareholder value'130 This is not, of course, to say that increased shareholder activism, with its ultimate 
sanction of takeover,131 works so as to weed out `inefficient' or `under-performing' managements and to 
further long-term productive development. On the contrary, there is much evidence suggesting 
otherwise.132 As Ghirladucci, Hawley and Williams observe, in the U.S. `[shareholder] activists, when they 
have been effective, have been concerned overwhelmingly with financial performance rather than long-
term productive investment'.133 The result, paradoxically, is that many now fear that the rise of institutional 
investment and the imposition on managers of capital market disciplines may be eradicating the 
`ownership and control' problem, but in ways that bring a damaging increase in rentier power over 
corporate policy and threaten a new tyranny of money and finance.134  
 Many are now, therefore, urging that separate corporate personality be taken more seriously. 
The economist John Kay, for example, favourably contrasts the European and Japanese conceptions of 
the corporation with those of Britain and America, and advocates recognition of the corporation as a 
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`public body', as `an institution with personality, character, and aspirations of its own ... [whose] objectives 
encompass the interests of a wide-range of stakeholder groups - investors, employees, suppliers, 
customers and managers ...'.135 Kay calls for the adoption of a German `stakeholding' conception of the 
company as `a community in itself and an organisation in turn embedded in a community', in which 
directors are cast in the role of trustees of the corporate assets, including its employees. We need, he 
says, `an organic model of corporate behaviour which gives to the corporation life independent from its 
shareholders or stakeholders' and which recognises it `as an end in itself'.136 Many others, of course, 
have similarly advocated the adoption of a stakeholding conception of the company.137 What is 
particularly interesting about Kay's argument is that it has led him to reformulate the nature of the 
governance problem in terms of ownership per se.138 Evaluating the ownership claim of corporate 
shareholders using A.M. Honore's analysis of the nature of ownership,139 he concludes that while they 
are unquestionably the owners of a corporation's shares, they can hardly be described as the owners of 
the corporation itself. Of Honore's eleven ownership tests, they only satisfy two unequivocally and three 
partially; six are not fulfilled at all.140 The `obvious conclusion', he suggests, is that while `many individuals 
and groups [customers, shareholders, lenders, employees, directors] have rights and obligations around 
[public] companies', `none of these claims can plausibly be described as ownership'.141 Moreover, Kay is 
not alone in framing the issue in these terms. The management theorist Charles Handy similarly 
questions the idea that shareholders are `owners', likening them instead to racegoers placing their money 
on financial runners. `Punters or speculators they may be', he argues, `owners in any real sense they 
cannot be'.142  Although less sympathetic to stakeholding, he, too, argues that we need `to rethink what 
we mean by a company' and see it not as property but as a community.143  
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Rethinking corporate shareholding and corporate property rights 
 The question remains however, how, having recognised the `existential corporation',144 does one 
begin to give content to the idea of the independent corporate interest which underlies it? Like many 
others, Kay's concern is with furthering the independent business interest of the company; with what 
Lipton and Rosenblum call `the interest of the corporation in its long-term success as a business 
enterprise'.145 He therefore advocates managers who will further `the broad purposes of the corporation, 
and not simply ... the financial interests of shareholders'. For him, the choice between different 
governance structures `ultimately depends not on legal theory but on economic performance' and the 
purpose of the corporate manager should be to `build a good business' which is internationally 
competitive.146 But as Paul Davies points out, this particular attempt to free corporations from 
shareholder domination risks an unhelpful form of corporate reification. `The notion of the corporation 
having an independent interest', he observes, `serves to obscure the potential conflicts among the 
various groups of persons affected by the way the company is run, or worse, to disguise a policy of 
promoting the interests of one of those groups at the expense of the others'.147 Arguably, the idea of the 
corporation's independent business interest entails not so much a genuine balancing of the interests of 
different `stakeholder' groups, but a tempering of the immediate shareholder interest in such a way as to 
elevate the long-term shareholder interest, represented by the independent interest of `the corporation'. In 
this context, stakeholding is likely to be endorsed only to the extent that long-term shareholder value is 
better enhanced by building better relations with employees, suppliers and customers.148  
 Other versions of stakeholding seek a more radical detachment of `the company' from its 
shareholders, one which recognises the corporation as a social institution and downplays the idea of it as 
a private, profit oriented `business'. Thus, one finds calls for a `new organisational paradigm' which 
recognises the `productive organisation as a public institution with responsibilties which go beyond the 
residual claims of owners of capital';149 for a conception of the corporation which embodies an `enlarge[d] 
vision of the firm' as a `political and social institution with its own organisational and industrial relations 
dynamics'.150  However, the specific proposals for reform which have thus far emerged are relatively 
modest. They are generally aimed either at influencing or tempering shareholder behaviour, or giving 
greater `voice' within companies to other `stakeholder' groups. Thus, many seek to make shareholders 
more `committed' and less `short-termist', through, for example, quinquennial directorial elections which 
would effectively disenfranchise shareholders in the interim period.151 Others advocate locking 
shareholders into their bets by making it harder for them to switch corporate horses, for example by 
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levying taxes on securities trading.152 Still others propose changes in directors duties to encompass other 
corporate stakeholders.153 More radically, some suggest giving board representation to `stakeholders', 
perhaps through the introduction of two-tier boards.154  However, while many of these proposals would, in 
different ways, erode still further the dwindling `ownership' rights of shareholders, they fail fully to confront 
the ownership issue, leaving relatively untouched what Charles Handy has called the `extraordinary 
privilege' accorded to corporate shareholders who, `for the price of their bets, [are] given a vote from time 
to time in the auction ring as to who should own their horse', with the result, of course, that they need 
continuously to be wooed. In a context in which corporate managers, quite apart from their class 
predilections and share options, are increasingly subject to growing institutional investor, capital market 
and rentier power, it must be doubted whether attempts to enhance the power and rights of stakeholding 
groups, alone, will achieve a great deal.155 Indeed, at present, notwithstanding the rise of stakeholding, 
we appear to be moving ever further from the realisation of a conception of the corporation as a social 
institution, for as John Gray points out, with the spread of neo-liberal ideology and contract culture, as an 
institution, the corporation, like many others, is being `weakened' and `hollowed out'.156  
 For this reason, any attempt to realise a fully social conception of the corporation must begin with 
a fundamental re-evaluation of the nature of corporate shareholding and of shareholder rights. This 
necessarily entails dispelling not only the myth of shareholder corporate ownership, but other myths that 
serve to legitimate their governance rights. For example, it is often claimed that shareholders are `risk-
takers' deserving of reward as `providers' of capital. But this misunderstands both the risks associated 
with and the nature of corporate shareholding. While equity investment is theoretically riskier than, say, 
investment in government stock, it is clear that, historically, equities have offered both low-risks 
investment and, in the medium to long-term, better average returns.157 Even more importantly, the great 
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majority of share dealings involve not issues raising capital for new investment but the buying and selling 
of titles to revenue issued long ago. As a whole the stock market today does little to raise capital for new 
investment. Between 1981 and early 1996, for example, U.S. nonfinancial corporations retired more 
stock ($700 billion) than they issued, thanks to takeovers and buybacks.158 It is also important to dispose 
of the suggestion that the shareholder interest is acquiring `a new legitimacy' because it now represents, 
in part, the long-term savings of the more privileged members of the working class.159 While for some 
this `socialisation' of shareholding holds out the prospect of pension-fund socialism,160 as Doug Henwood 
points out workers would be ill-advised `to trade a few extra percentage points return on their pension 
fund, on which they may draw some decades in the future, for 30 or 40 years of falling wages and rising 
unemployment insecurity.' Given that the whole purpose of shareholder activism is to increase the profit 
share of national income and to claim a larger proportion of that profit for rentiers, he explains, `any gains 
to people of modest means are accidental'.161 In short, shareholders should be recognised for what they 
really are - `functionless investors'162, passive owners of claims to part of the labour of others with a 
resemblance to old-fashioned usurers - and not mistaken for dynamic, risk-taking, deserving, corporate 
`owners'.163   
 As Berle and Means noted many years ago, this places a question mark over the legitimate 
extent of shareholder rights. Having `surrendered control and responsibility' over corporate assets, 
shareholders, they suggested, had `surrendered the right that the corporation should be operated in their 
sole interest' and `released the community from the obligation to protect them to the full extent implied in 
the strict doctrine of property rights'.164 In fact, what is at issue here is arguably even more fundamental 
than Berle and Means realised, for the emergence of the modern depersonified corporation represents 
not merely a dilution of shareholder corporate property rights but the demise of the means of production 
as private property to which notions of `ownership', with their connotations of exclusivity and exclusion, 
are applicable. Indeed, this is something that company law itself recognises, albeit partially, imperfectly 
and distortedly, in its constitution of the incorporated company as an autonomous, essentially 
depersonalised, property-owning legal person. It was for this reason that for Marx the rise of the modern 
corporation represented `the abolition of capital as private property within the framework of capitalist 
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production itself ... private production without the control of private property'165. And that for Schumpeter it 
`[took] the life out of [private] property', marking the disappearance of `the figure of the proprietor and with 
it the specifically proprietary interest' and illustrating how capitalism undermines its own institutional 
framework.166 In this context, the share - `the evaporation of the material substance of property'167 - is 
best seen as an attempt to preserve corporate assets as objects for generating private profit despite even 
though they are no longer private property `owned by shareholders;168 and the current neo-liberal fashion 
for theorising the company as a `nexus of contracts' best seen as an attempt not merely to preserve the 
share but to legitimate the tenuous claims of vestigial, rentier shareholders to a significant part of the 
social product. Despite the corporate vanishing trick that these theorists perform, however, the result of 
their desire to re-establish corporate assets as private property and to forestall recognition of the fact that 
in the corporate context `ownership is a problem rather than a pre-supposition'169 is an ungainly attempt 
to turn the clock back and to repersonify the corporation as an aggregate of capital-supplying 
individuals.170 
 It is not, however, only the erosion of the means of production as private property and the 
consequent unsuitability when applied to corporations of traditional ideas of `ownership' that points to the 
fundamentally social nature of corporate assets. Modern corporations - and the millions who participate in 
their activities worldwide and the many more millions who depend, directly and indirectly, on the success 
of those activities - are reflections and expressions of the general decline of production as a `truly 
"private" economic activity'.171 They are aspects of the socialisation of production and of the growing 
economic interdependence that characterises modern capitalism. Increasingly, our collective material 
fate is inextricably bound up with the use we make of corporate assets. It is arguable, therefore, that not 
only are corporate assets no longer private property, but that, as the product of the collective labour of 
generations upon which we all depend, there are compelling grounds for designating them common 
property.  
 Ultimately, it is to these changes in the nature of corporate property and the process of 
production that stakeholders and others are alluding when they describe the corporation as a `social' or 
`public' institution. In this context, the immediate need is to dispel the residual identification of corporation 
with shareholders and to complete the process, begun last century, of corporate depersonification. This 
would not in itself provide answers to the difficult questions concerning the allocation of power and rights 
in and over corporations and their activities, but it would, by dispelling the ownership myth and the private 
property premisses upon which it is based, at least enable these questions to be asked.172 By facilitating 
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recognition of the corporation not as an `owner', nor as an object capable of being owned, but as a 
network of social and productive relationships, it would enable us to begin the process of 
reconceptualising the corporation and corporate property. It cannot be doubted that this - and the 
replacement of private, shareholder-centred mechanisms by more democratic, social mechanisms of 
governance that would accompany it - will be extremely difficult to achieve. Quite apart from the 
formidable political obstacles, as Sealy observes `at present our company law lacks the conceptual ... 
tools ... to reflect our new perception of the [public] company as no longer a shareholders' collective, but 
an enterprise in which the interests of many stakeholders have to be balanced'.173 We have to start 
somewhere, however, and we could do worse than to heed Handy's advice and demote shareholders to 
the status of `mortgage men'.174 Not only would this be more befitting their largely parasitical role, it 
would, by transforming share markets into betting shops rather than auctions and by loosening the grip of 
capital, help to create more space within which the implicit sociality of the corporation might be realised. 
In the meantime, with the residual `ownership' rights of corporate shareholders still in place, corporate 
property will, through the share, continue to be `a mutation of private property'175 and a debased mutation 
at that. In this context, the fears of the ancient and medieval critics of usury seem ever more prescient, 
for as rentier investment and finance in its manifold forms asserts ever more forcefully its social power 
and right to part of the unpaid labour of others, we see growing injustice in exchange, a continuing 
upward redistribution of income (nationally and internationally), and a disintegration of the bonds that tie 
society together. In the corporate context, as financial markets demand, in the name of shareholder value 
and financial prudence, cutbacks in both public and private investment, we see increasing exploitation at 
work, a disregard for communities and the environment, a shortening of time horizons, and a secular 
decline in `real' investment. As Deakin and Slinger rightly say, there is `no guarantee of compatability 
between a company law system aimed primarily at the protection of shareholder value and society's 
interest in maintaining a productive corporate sector'.176 Or as Keynes put it, `we cannot as a community 
provide for future consumption by financial expedients but only by current physical output'.177 Ultimately, a 
society guarantees its future only by real physical and social investments. For this reason, the increased 
shareholder activism sought by many, including the present Labour government, is likely to prove to be 
the disease that purports to be the cure. 
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